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Abstract: We consider a market model in which all commodities are inher-
ently indivisible and thus are traded in integer quantities. We ask whether a
¯nite set of price-quantity observations satisfying the Generalized Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference (GARP) is consistent with utility maximization. Although
familiar conditions such as non-satiation become meaningless in the current
discrete model, by re¯ning the standard notion of demand set we show that
Afriat's celebrated theorem still holds true. Exploring network structure and
a new and easy-to-use variant of GARP, we propose an elementary, simple,
intuitive, combinatorial, and constructive proof for the result.
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1 Introduction
The theory of demand typically assumes that all commodities in the market are perfectly
divisible, and a consumer, when faced with prices and a budget, will choose an a®ordable
bundle to achieve a maximal utility. In a pioneering article, Afriat (1967) started with
a ¯nite set of observed market prices and the consumer's demand quantities and asked
whether such observations are actually consistent with the maximization of a locally non-
satiated utility function. By induction he established a remarkable result stating that
the observations are consistent with utility maximization if and only if they satisfy the
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference|a simple testable condition. This work has
stimulated considerable interest and substantial follow-up research; see Diewert (1973),
Varian (1982), Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003), Fostel, Scarf and Todd (2004),
Piaw and Vohra (2003), Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) among many others.
See Varian (2006) and Vermeulen (2011) for more references.
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1While the literature focuses on the case of divisible goods, the current paper attempts
to extend the theory to an equally important and practical case in which all commodities
are traded in integer quantities, for instance, when all goods are inherently indivisible.
In reality, indivisible commodities are pervasive and constitute signi¯cant parts of many
economies. In general, they are durable and expensive, to name but a few, such as houses,
cars, computers, machines, arts, employees, and airplanes. In fact, many divisible goods
are also traded in discrete quantities, such as oil sold in barrels. Obviously, modeling
economies with indivisibilities is more meaningful and more realistic. The importance of
studying such economies has long been recognized by many economists, including Lerner
(1944), Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Debreu (1959), Arrow and Hahn (1971), Shapley
and Scarf (1974), Kelso and Crawford (1982), and Scarf (1986, 1994). In the current
environment, due to absence of perfect divisibility and continuity, familiar conditions such
as non-satiation can no longer be applied. To tackle the problem, we need to re¯ne the
standard concept of demand set. Using this re¯nement, we will be able to show that Afriat's
theorem still holds true in the current discrete case. This demonstrates surprisingly wide
appeal and adaptability of Afriat's theorem. We also introduce an easy-to-use variant of the
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference. Using network structure and the new variant
of GARP, we present a very elementary, simple, intuitive, combinatorial and constructive
proof for the result. The basic idea of the proof was used explicitly in Piaw and Vohra
(2003) and also implicitly in Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), Varian (1982), and Fostel, Scarf
and Todd (2004). Here we improve the argument considerably and make it very transparent
and accessible without assuming the reader's familiarity with any fundamental result from
graph theory, linear programming, or any other mathematical subject. The proof is so
easy that it can be understood by college economics students. In addition the proof is not
restricted to indivisible goods and can be equally applied to divisible goods.
2 Main Results
We begin by reviewing the purchase decision problem of a consumer. There are n di®erent
types of commodities in the market. The consumer has a budget b for consumption and
a utility function u : I R
n
+ ! I R.4 Suppose p 2 I R
n
+ are the prevailing market prices, each
component pi indicating the price of commodity i. Then the consumer's decision problem
is to choose a bundle x in I R
n
+ which gives him the highest utility and is also a®ordable
to him. Such a bundle is called an optimal bundle. Alternatively, we can describe all his





+ denotes the nonnegative orthant of the n-dimensional Euclidean space I R




+ to stand for the set of all integral vectors in I R
n and I R
n
+, respectively.
2In the literature it is typically assumed that all commodities are perfectly divisible
and also the consumer's utility function u is locally non-satiated in the sense that for
every x 2 I R
n
+, and in every neighborhood of x, there is another bundle having a higher
utility. Suppose that a market analyst wishes to examine the consumer's demand behavior.
It is natural to assume that the analyst does not know the consumer's utility function
and his budget °ow but does know that the consumer does not change his preferences
over a period of time. Suppose that the analyst has now collected a ¯nite observed data
set f(pi;xi) j i = 1;¢¢¢ ;mg with respect to the consumer over the time i = 1;¢¢¢ ;m,
where pi 2 I R
n
+ is the price vector and xi 2 I R
n
+ is the consumer's demand bundle under
prices pi and (probably an unobservable) budget bi (which may vary over the time). The
fundamental question raised by Afriat (1967) is whether these observations are consistent
with the consumer's demand behavior under a locally non-satiated utility function u in the
sense that xi 2 Du(pi;bi) for all i = 1;¢¢¢ ;m. To verify the consistency, several criteria
have been proposed. Among them, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) and
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) are most well-known and widely
used.
A consumer's choice behavior is said to satisfy the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference
(SARP) if, for every sequence of pairs of price vector and demand bundle (p1;x1), (p2;x2),
¢¢¢, (pm;xm) satisfying pj ¢ xj+1 · pj ¢ xj for all j · m ¡ 1, we have pm ¢ x1 > pm ¢ xm.
SARP was due to Houthakker (1950).5 Moreover, we say that the consumer's behavior
satis¯es the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if, for every sequence of
pairs of price vector and demand bundle (p1;x1), ¢¢¢, (pm;xm) satisfying pj ¢xj+1 · pj ¢xj
for all j · m ¡ 1, we have pm ¢ x1 ¸ pm ¢ xm. GARP is more general than SARP and was
introduced in Varian (1982).6
Given a ¯nite observed data set f(pi;xi) j i 2 Mg, where M = f1;2;¢¢¢ ;mg, pi 2 I R
n
+
is a price vector and xi 2 I R
n
+ is the corresponding demand bundle, we say that a utility
function u rationalizes the observed behavior if the data can be generated as the outcome
of the utility-maximization, i.e., xi 2 Du(pi;bi) for some bi and for all i. We also say that
the data set f(pi;xi) j i 2 Mg satis¯es GARP if, for every subset f(pij;xij) j j = 1;¢¢¢ ;tg
of the data set f(pi;xi) j i 2 Mg, pij ¢ xij+1 · pij ¢ xij for all j · t ¡ 1 implies pit ¢ xi1 ¸
pit ¢xit. Afriat (1967) establishes a celebrated result stating that a ¯nite observed data set
f(pi;xi) j i 2 Mg is consistent with utility maximization if and only if the observations
satisfy GARP. To prove that the observations derived from utility maximization satisfy
GARP, the standard approach is to use the non-satiation property of the utility function;
see, e.g., Diewert (1973, pp. 420-421), Fostel, Scarf and Todd (2004, p.212), and Varian
5Samuelson (1948) introduced a more restrictive axiom than SARP, now known as the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference.
6GARP is equivalent to Afriat (1967)'s Cyclical Consistency.
3(1982, p.946). On this point, see Vermeulen (2011, p.4) for a historical account.
As stated earlier, our purpose is to consider the environment where all commodities are
inherently indivisible, such as houses and cars. Needless to say, it is more realistic to assume
that all goods are traded in integer (or rational) quantities. Thus in the current situation,
the consumer's consumption set will be Z
n
+ instead of I R
n
+, and his utility function will be
u : Z
n
+ ! I R. To make the model even more practical, the price space is also assumed to be
Z
n
+ instead of I R
n
+. For instance, no unit of a price is less than a penny or cent. Under the
current framework, non-satiation is meaningless. This implies that the existing approach of
using non-satiation to show that the observations derived from utility maximization satisfy
GARP can no longer be applied. To deal with the current model, we ¯rst need to modify
the standard notion of the consumer's demand set. Given p 2 Z
n
+ and budget b 2 Z+, the
demand set of the consumer is given by Du(p;b) = argmaxfu(x) j p ¢ x · b; x 2 Z
n
+g. We
re¯ne the demand set Du(p;b) as follows:
D
¤
u(p;b) = fx 2 Du(p;b) j p ¢ x · p ¢ y; 8y 2 Du(p;b)g
That is, D¤
u(p;b) contains those bundles which not only give the consumer the highest
utility under his budget but also have the least cost. Any bundle in D¤
u(p;b) will be called
an optimal bundle with tight budget and D¤
u(p;b) the tight budget demand set. In this case,
we say that the consumer is a tight budget utility maximizer. A tiny step forward as it
might appear to be, this re¯nement is meaningful and natural, more importantly crucial
to our analysis on the current discrete model. Of course, this concept can be applied to
the continuous case as well for which the non-satiation assumption can be dropped.
The next little example demonstrates that observations derived just from utility max-
imization without tight budget could violate GARP. Suppose that the consumer faces
two indivisible goods and has the utility function of u(x1;x2) = minfx1;x2g for every
(x1;x2) 2 Z
2
+ and a budget of 32. The prevailing market prices are p1 = (10;11) and
p2 = (11;10), respectively. Then we have possible outcomes x1 = (1;2) 2 Du(p1;b) =
f(2;1);(1;2);(1;1)g and x2 = (2;1) 2 Du(p2;b) = Du(p1;b). Because p1¢(x2¡x1) = ¡1 < 0
and p2 ¢ (x1 ¡ x2) = ¡1 < 0, GARP is violated! However, using the tight budget demand
set we have D¤
u(p1;b) = f(1;1)g = D¤
u(p2;b), so that outcomes should be x1 = x2 = (1;1).
Because p1 ¢ (x2 ¡ x1) = p2 ¢ (x1 ¡ x2) = 0, GARP is satis¯ed! Let us make a com-
parison with the case of divisible goods. We have the same form of utility function
u(x1;x2) = minfx1;x2g for every (x1;x2) 2 I R
2
+ and the same budget of 32. The same
market prices are p1 = (10;11) and p2 = (11;10), respectively. Note that because goods
are perfectly divisible, the consumption space is I R
2
+ instead of Z
2
+. In this case we have
Du(p1;b) = D¤
u(p1;b) = Du(p2;b) = D¤
u(p2;b) = f(32
21; 32
21)g and GARP is trivially satis¯ed.
Moreover the consumer achieves a higher utility of 32
21 than 1 in the case of indivisible
goods.
4The following result shows a bene¯t of the introduction of the tight budget demand
set. Observe that we do not impose any condition on the consumer's utility function
u : Z
n
+ ! I R. The proof is quite simple but does make use of the de¯nition of the tight
budget demand set.





i 2 M is derived from tight budget utility maximization, the data set must satisfy GARP.
Proof. By assumption we know xj 2 D¤
u(pj;bj) for all j = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;m. Suppose that
if pj ¢ xj+1 · pj ¢ xj, then xj+1 could have been purchased at prices pj. Since xj+1 was
not purchased at pj, it cannot be strictly preferred to xj so that u(xj) ¸ u(xj+1). The
entire sequence of inequalities u(xj) ¸ u(xj+1), j = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;m¡1 implies u(x1) ¸ u(xm).
Suppose to the contrary that pm ¢ x1 < pm ¢ xm. Then u(xm) · u(x1) together with
pm¢x1 < pm¢xm would imply xm 62 D¤
u(pm;bm), yielding a contradiction! So pm¢x1 ¸ pm¢xm
and GARP is satis¯ed. 2
A utility function u : Z
n
+ ! I R is discrete concave if, for every x1;x2;¢¢¢ ;xt 2 Z
n
+ with
t · n+1 and every rational ¸1 ¸ 0;¸2;¢¢¢ ;¸t ¸ 0 with
Pt
j=1 ¸j = 1 and
Pt








The following theorem is a discrete analogue of the Afriat's theorem and gives a simple
testable necessary and su±cient condition that a ¯nite observed data set must satisfy in
order to be consistent with tight budget utility maximization.




+ for all j 2 M satisfy GARP if and only
if there exists a discrete concave and integer-valued utility function that rationalizes the
observations in the sense of tight budget utility maximization.
`If part' is proved in Lemma 1 above. The proof of `only if' proceeds in several steps. First
we construct the data matrix B = (b(i;j)) of order m from the observations (pj;xj) for
all j 2 M by de¯ning b(i;j) = pi ¢ (xj ¡ xi);8 i;j 2 M. Observe that b(i;i) = 0 and all
b(i;j)'s are integral, because xj's and pj's are integral.
Following Afriat (1967), let us ¯rst assume (in fact later we will show) that there exist
integers Ã1, Ã2, ¢¢¢, Ãm, and ¯1 > 0, ¯2 > 0, ¢¢¢, ¯m > 0 to the following system of linear
inequalities|called Afriat inequalities
Ãj · Ãi + ¯ib(i;j); 8 i;j 2 M: (1)
Now we de¯ne the utility function on I R
n
+ by
~ u(x) = minfÃ1 + ¯1p
1 ¢ (x ¡ x
1);¢¢¢ ;Ãm + ¯mp
m ¢ (x ¡ x
m)g
5Every term in this expression is linear and hence concave. Thus, ~ u, as their point-wise
minimum, is also concave. Since all Ãj, ¯j, pj, and xj are integral, ~ u(x) is an integer value
as long as x is integral. Because ~ u is concave on I R
n
+, obviously its restriction on Z
n
+ must
be discrete concave and integer-valued. The next two steps show that ~ u rationalizes the
observations.
(i). ~ u(xj) = Ãj for all j 2 M. By de¯nition ~ u(xj) = mini2MfÃi + ¯ib(i;j)g = Ãj, where
the minimum is taken from the Afriat inequalities.
(ii). pj¢x · pj¢xj implies ~ u(x) · ~ u(xj). Note that ~ u(x) · Ãj+¯jpj¢(x¡xj) · Ãj = ~ u(xj),
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the de¯nition of ~ u, the second from the fact that
pj ¢ x · pj ¢ xj and ¯j > 0, and the last equality from (i).
We have shown that the Afriat inequalities imply the existence of a desirable utility
function ~ u rationalizing the observations. We will soon prove that if the observations




1 > 0, ¢¢¢, ¯¤
m > 0.
We use the data matrix B = (b(i;j)) to construct a directed graph G(¯) = (M;A;¯)
with ¯ 2 Z
m
+, where M = f1;2;¢¢¢ ;mg is the set of vertices corresponding to the indices
1;¢¢¢ ;m of the observations, and for i;j 2 M with i 6= j the ordered pair (i;j) 2 A is
an arc with an integer length or weight ¯ib(i;j). Here i is the tail and j the head of the
arc (i;j). Let 1 = (1;¢¢¢ ;1) 2 Z
m
+ be the m-vector of all 10s. In the sequel, we ¯rst pay
attention to the particular graph G(1).
We need to borrow several basic de¯nitions from graph theory. A path in a graph G is
an alternating sequence (i1;(i1;i2);i2;(i2;i3);¢¢¢ ;(ik¡1;ik);ik), where ij, j = 1;¢¢¢ ;k are
vertices, and (ij;ij+1), j = 1;¢¢¢ ;k ¡ 1, are arcs in the graph. In this case we also say
that there is a path from vertex i1 to vertex ik. i1 is called the starting vertex and ik the
terminal vertex of the path. A path is a shortest path from vertex i to vertex j in a graph
if the sum of the lengths of all arcs on the path is smallest among all possible paths from
i to j in the graph. A path with at least one arc is called a cycle if the starting vertex
of the path coincides with its terminal vertex and the other vertices are distinct. A cycle
is called a negative (zero, or positive) length cycle if the sum of the lengths of all arcs in
the cycle is strictly less than zero (equal to zero, or strictly greater than zero). We may
use C to denote a cycle. For ease of notation, C means simply the collection of all arcs in
the cycle C. A (sub)graph H is said to be strongly connected if for arbitrary two vertices
u;v in the graph H there exists a path in H from u to v. A maximal strongly connected
subgraph of a graph G is called a strongly connected component of the graph G.
With respect to the graph G(1), we can rephrase the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) in three slightly di®erent ways. The ¯rst was used in Afriat (1967) as
Cyclical Consistency, the second was given in Piaw and Vohra (2003), and the third is new
6but similar to the second, and convenient to use in the following proof.
De¯nition 1 The data matrix B satis¯es GARP if every cycle C in the graph G(1) with
b(i;j) · 0 for all arcs (i;j) 2 C, implies b(i;j) = 0 for all (i;j) 2 C.
De¯nition 2 The data matrix B satis¯es GARP if every negative length cycle in the graph
G(1) contains at least one arc of positive length.
The following de¯nition di®ers from the second in that it does not need to use the sum of
the lengths of all arcs in each cycle but instead it requires that if any cycle contains an arc
of negative weight, it should also contain an arc of positive weight.
De¯nition 3 The data matrix B satis¯es GARP if in the graph G(1) every cycle that
contains an arc of negative length must also contain an arc of positive length.
We are now ready to present a constructive and combinatorial proof which gives ex-
plicitly integral solutions Ã¤
1, ¢¢¢, Ã¤
m, and ¯¤
1 > 0, ¢¢¢, ¯¤
m > 0 to the system (1) of Afriat
inequalities. As pointed out previously, the basic idea of our proof has been used explicitly
in Piaw and Vohra (2003), and also implicitly in Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), Varian
(1982), Fostel, Scarf and Todd (2004). Piaw and Vohra (2003) explicitly used the network
structure underlying the Afriat inequalities, whereas Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), Varian
(1982), and Fostel, Scarf and Todd (2004) only explored it implicitly or in a less straight-
forward way. Here we make the argument very elementary, transparent and accessible
without assuming the reader's familiarity with any fundamental result from graph theory
or linear programming. Another advantage of the current proof is that it can help the
reader have a better understanding of why the original case considered by Afriat (1967) is
essential, albeit restrictive in the sense that all b(i;j)'s are required to be non-zero.




1 > 0, ¢¢¢, ¯¤
m > 0 as output. The algorithm goes as
follows. (If b(i;j) ¸ 0 for all i;j 2 M, then Ã¤
i = ¯¤
i = 1 (8i 2 M) give a feasible solution
of Afriat's inequalities, so that we assume b(i;j) < 0 for some i;j 2 M in the sequel.)
Initialization Use the data matrix B to construct the graph G(1) = (M;A;1).
Step 1 Remove all arcs (i;j) with positive weight b(i;j) > 0 from the graph G(1),
resulting in a directed graph G¡(1).
Step 2 Decompose the graph G¡(1) into strongly connected components H1, H2, ¢¢¢,
H·, where H0
is are indexed in such a way that if there exists a path from Hi to Hj with
i 6= j, then i < j. If some component Hi contains an arc of negative length, then the
observed data is not consistent with GARP, and the algorithm terminates.
7Step 3 Choose a su±ciently large integer L > 0, e.g., take L = (m¡1)maxi;j2Mfjb(i;j)j j
b(i;j) < 0g. For every l = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;·, let the multiplier ¯¤
i of every vertex i in the subgraph
Hl be equal to ¯¤
i = Ll¡1, the (l ¡ 1)-th power of L.
Step 4 Use the integers ¯¤
i , i 2 M, to construct the graph G(¯¤). Take Ã¤
1 = 0. For
any i 2 M with i > 1, let Ã¤
i be equal to the length of a shortest path from vertex 1 to
vertex i in the graph G(¯¤).
The numbering of the strongly connected components H1, H2, ¢¢¢, H· is called a
topological ordering, and each Hi is an equivalence class with respect to the binary relation
induced by reachability by paths. Let us illustrate the working of the algorithm by an
example. Suppose that the data set is given
f(p
i;x
i) j i 2 Mg = f((10;1);(1;2));((10;11);(1;1));((1;10);(2;1));((11;10);(1;1))g;







0 ¡1 9 ¡1
11 0 10 0
9 ¡1 0 ¡1







It is easy to check that the graph G¡(1) consists of three strongly connected components
H1 containing vertex 1, H2 vertex 3, and H3 vertices 2 and 4. Then we have · = 3, L = 3,
¯¤
1 = 1, ¯¤
3 = 3, and ¯¤
2 = ¯¤
4 = 9. Computing shortest paths from vertex 1 to i 2 M in
the graph G(¯¤) yields Ã¤
1 = 0, Ã¤
3 = 9, and Ã¤
2 = Ã¤
4 = ¡1. We could also have another
topological ordering due to the fact that in the graph G¡(1), vertices 1 and 3 are not
connected. So the graph G¡(1) also consists of three strongly connected components H1
containing vertex 3, H2 vertex 1, and H3 vertices 2 and 4. We have · = 3, L = 3, ¯¤
3 = 1,
¯¤
1 = 3, and ¯¤
2 = ¯¤
4 = 9. Computing shortest paths in the graph G(¯¤) yields Ã¤
1 = 0,
Ã¤
3 = 27, and Ã¤
2 = Ã¤
4 = ¡3.
We are now ready to establish the following general result.
Lemma 2 Under GARP, the integers ¯¤
i > 0 and Ã¤
i, i 2 M, generated by the algorithm,
are the solution to the system of Afriat inequalities.
Proof. It is easy to see that the graph G¡(1) generated in Step 1 of the algorithm
contains no negative length cycle because of GARP, but may contain zero length cycle
with all arcs of zero length. Each zero length cycle with all arcs of zero length must be
in one of strongly connected components H0
is. Notice that due to the decomposition into
strongly connected components of G¡(1) there exists no path from Hj to Hi with j > i.
See, e.g., Fujishige (2005, p.13) on the decomposition of more general graphs.
8Next we show that the graph G(¯¤) contains no negative length cycle. Put K =
maxi;j2Mfjb(i;j)j j b(i;j) < 0g and L = (m ¡ 1)K. Let C be any cycle in G(¯¤). If all
the vertices of cycle C belong to the vertex set of a single strongly connected component,
the length of C is nonnegative. Hence we assume that C contains vertices of at least two
strongly connected components. Let i¤ be the maximum index i such that Hi contains a
vertex of cycle C. Then there exists an arc (y¤;z¤) in C such that y¤ belongs to Hi¤ and
z¤ to Hj¤ with j¤ < i¤. Now suppose that the arcs in C of negative length are given by
(y1;z1);¢¢¢ ;(y`;z`). Note that for each s = 1;¢¢¢ ;`, vertex ys belongs to Hj with j < i¤.
Hence,












i¤¡1 ¡ (m ¡ 1)KL
i¤¡2 = 0;
where note that b(y¤;z¤) is a positive integer.
Because the graph G(¯¤) contains no negative length cycle, for every i 2 M with
i > 1 there exists a shortest path, of length Ã¤
i, from vertex 1 to vertex i and thus Ã¤
i is







i b(i;j); 8i;j 2 M:
Observe that the left-hand side is the length of a shortest path from vertex 1 to vertex j
and the right-hand side is the length of a path from vertex 1 to vertex j composed of a
shortest path from vertex 1 to vertex i and the arc (i;j) from vertex i to vertex j. The
de¯nition of a shortest path validates clearly the above inequality for all i;j 2 M. 2
3 Concluding Remarks
We wrap up our discussion with several remarks. Afriat (1967) established his theorem
using the method of induction for the special but essential case of all b(i;j) 6= 0 with
i 6= j. This can be seen from our proof, namely, his case will generate exactly m strongly
connected components H1;H2;¢¢¢ ;Hm, each consisting of a single vertex, where m is the
number of observations.
Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) studied the general case in which b(i;j)'s with i 6= j
are allowed to be zero. This case involves the subtle issue of indi®erence classes in the re-
vealed preference ordering. They considered the binary relation (i;j) meaning b(i;j) · 0,
and examined the transitive closure of the relation and indi®erence classes. Their indi®er-
ence classes can be seen as the strongly connected components in our graph G¡(1). While
Diewert (1973) found the solution to the system of Afriat inequalities by solving a lin-
ear programming problem, in part of his proof Varian (1982) employed a graph-theoretic
9algorithm for computing the transitive closure of the binary relation. Their proofs also
contained an inductive argument and were complex and lengthy.
Fostel, Scarf and Todd (2004) provided two proofs of Afriat's theorem. The ¯rst is an
induction method and also implicitly uses a structure similar to our graph G¡(1). Their
second proof makes use of the duality theorem from linear programming. Piaw and Vohra
(2003) explored explicitly the network structure inherent in the Afriat inequalities and
presented a graph-theoretic constructive proof.
In the current paper we identify a common property|equivalence classes|used ex-
plicitly or implicitly in the ¯ve previous papers, and make full use of it. In particular,
we simplify their approaches by decomposing G¡(1) into strongly connected components
and taking a topological ordering of the components as H1; H2;; ¢¢¢ ;H·, from which
we can check whether observed data are consistent with GARP, and if consistent, we can
compute feasible ¯¤
i for i = 1;¢¢¢ ;m. This requires O(m2) time, while computing Ã¤
i for
i = 1;¢¢¢ ;m requires O(m3) time shortest path computation.
In summary, our proof is similar to Piaw and Vohra (2003) and also closely related to
Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), Varian (1982), and Fostel, Scarf and Todd (2004). Here
we have made the argument more transparent and more accessible without assuming the
reader's familiarity with any fundamental result from graph theory or linear programming.
In our argument, the explicit use of the decomposition into strongly connected components
plays an important role in helping reveal more detailed and more subtle structures of the
graph G(1) and simplify the proof considerably. Of course, the very elementary, intuitive
and simple proof of Afriat's theorem is merely a byproduct of the current paper whose
purpose has been to extend the theory to the equally important case of indivisible goods.
We hope that this paper will be of interest and use to researchers who wish to grasp the
essence and wide applicability of Afriat's celebrated theorem.
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